Decisions, games, and rational choice

Bachelor's degree

In Maynard (USA)

Price on request

Description

  • Type

    Bachelor's degree

  • Location

    Maynard (USA)

  • Start date

    Different dates available

Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them?

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Maynard (USA)
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02139

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Course programme

Lectures: 2 sessions / week, 1.5 hours / session


This class will focus on the foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory, and the theory of collective choice. We will be interested in general questions about the nature of practical rationality, contrasting interpretations of probability and of utility, the status of the principle of expected utility, with the application of these concepts to the study of the interaction of different rational agents in competitive and cooperative situations, and with the relationship between individual values and the values of groups, institutions and societies. We will try to connect an examination of the basic concepts of Bayesian decision theory with philosophical questions about the nature of action, personal identity, deliberation and responsibility, and an examination of the basic concepts of game theory and social choice theory with philosophical questions about the interaction of epistemic and causal concepts, individual and group decision making, and the nature of meaning and communication.


There are no prerequisites for this course.


The following book will provide the main framework for the class:


Resnik, Michael. Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. ISBN: 9780816614400.


This will be supplemented with material that will be made available, as we go, including readings from five other books:


Jeffrey, Richard. The Logic of Decision. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780226395821.


Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. ISBN: 9780674840317.


Joyce, James M. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999. ISBN: 9780521641647.


Leyton-Brown, Kevin, and Yoav Shoham. Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction. San Rafael, CA: Morgan and Claypool Publishers, 2008. ISBN: 9781598295931.


Sen, Amartya K. Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982. ISBN: 9780262192149.


The required work for the class will consist of a sequence of short writing assignments, some more like problem sets, some more like short papers. The problem sets are ungraded. There will also be a final exam during the exam period in May.


We will spend a little more than a third of the term on individual decision theory, a little more than a third on game theory, and the rest of the time on the theory of social choice. In each part, we will start with the basic technical apparatus, but we will try to keep it simple, developing only as much of the technical framework as we need to raise the conceptual and philosophical questions that will be our main concern.


Preference, ignorance and risk


Probability – subjective and objective


Utility and value


Causal decision theory


Problem set 1 out 1 day after Ses #4 and due in Ses #6


Short paper 1 out 1 day after Ses #9


The basic framework


Nash Equilibrium and other solution concepts


Game theory and individual decision theory


Coordination games, bargaining and negotiation


Short paper 1 due in Ses #12


Short paper 2 out 1 day after Ses #16 and due 2 days after Ses #19


Defining social value in terms of individual value


Arrow's theorem, and other impossibility results


Interpersonal comparisons of utility


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Decisions, games, and rational choice

Price on request