Game theory

Lectures: 2 sessions / week, 1.5 hours / session

Recitations: 1 session / week, 1 hour / session

14.122 Microeconomic Theory II is the prerequisite for this course.

Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414.

1. Solution Concepts for Static Games

a. Complete information: rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, epistemic foundations

b. Incomplete information: Bayesian Nash equilibrium, interim correlated
rationalizability

2. Solution Concepts for Extensive-form Games

a. Backwards induction, subgame perfection, iterated conditional dominance

b. Bargaining with complete information

3. Equilibrium Concepts for Games with Imperfect Information

4. Signaling and Forward Induction

a. Stable equilirium, the intuitive criterion, iterated weak dominance, epistemic
foundations

5. Repeated Games

6. Reputation Formation

a. Reputation with short-lived opponents

b. Screening and reputation in bargaining

7. Supermodular Games

8. Global Games

9. Cooperative Games

a. Nash bargaining solution, core, Shapley value

b. Non-cooperative implentations

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